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Determinative Statute:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004) Arbitration Agreements.
(1) After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient
and a health care provider to be validly executed, or, if the requirements of this
Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on:

(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a
binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3,
1999.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In a great deal of pain and discomfort, plaintiff/appellee Gloria Soriano went to see
Dr. Elizabeth Graul on April 27, 2004. [R. 71]. Mrs. Soriano was handed a clipboard with
various forms to fill out while waiting for the doctor. [R. 72], One of these forms was Dr.
Graul's Arbitration Agreement which waived Mrs. Soriano's right to a jury trial without
informing her she could still receive treatment without signing. See Arbitration Agreement
attached as Appendix A. This type of "sign or die" agreement was invalidated by statutory
amendments which became effective one week after Mrs. Soriano's appointment.
Dr. Graul eventually performed surgery on Mrs. Soriano in May, 2004 which is the
basis of this lawsuit filed on September 11, 2006. [R. 1-5]. Instead of answering the
complaint, Dr. Graul moved the court to enforce her Arbitration Agreement. [R. 12-14].
There is no dispute Dr. Graul's Arbitration Agreement complied with the statutory
requirements of the 2003 version of Utah's Malpractice Arbitration statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-17 (2003)(referred to herein as the "Arbitration Act"). [R. 47]. Likewise, there is
no dispute the Agreement did not comply with the statutory amendments in the 2004 version
of the Arbitration Act (referred to herein as the "2004 Amendments"). [R. 75]. Honorable
Judge Kate Toomey ruled the 2004 Amendments were intended to apply retroactively. Id.
Dr. Graul's Arbitration Agreement was thus invalid because it did not satisfy the
requirements of the 2004 Amendments.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, Dr. Graul raises two issues, one explicit and one implied. Dr. GrauPs
stated issue is whether the district court correctly found the 2004 Amendments were
retroactive as to invalidate the Arbitration Agreement. The statute clearly stated it applied
to agreements signed after May 2, 1999 and, therefore, applied to Dr. Graul's Agreement
signed in April, 2004. Dr. Graul also argues retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments
violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, but Dr. Graul did not
preserve this issue for appeal.
Dr. Graul's last argument raises a second issue: whether the Agreement was renewed
in violation of the 2004 Amendments. Dr. Graul's strained construction of the Act to
circumvent the trial court's ruling on the retroactivity issue collapses in her final argument
which demonstrates even if the Agreement was not invalid when executed, it was never
properly renewed and, thus, equally ineffective to bar a jury trial of Mrs. Soriano's claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY DECLARED THE
AMENDMENTS MUST BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY

2004

Responding to public outcry over the ill-advised 2003 version of § 78-14-17, the
legislature amended the Arbitration Act to add various patient protections including the right
to receive treatment without signing an arbitration agreement.1 Despite the amendments'
1

See Bryson B. Morgan, Mandatory Medical Arbitration: The Wrong Answer to the
Rising Cost ofHealth Care in Utah, 6 Hinckley Journal of Politics 43 (2005), attached as
Appendix B.
6

effective date of May 3,2004, the legislature's enacting language began, "After May 2,1999.
for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be validly
executed . . . " (Emphasis added).
The trial court's reasoning for finding the Amendments retroactive is straightforward.
Had the legislature not wanted the 2004 Amendments applied retroactively, they would have
said so by drafting the enacting language to state, "After May 3, 2004 . . . " [R. 74-75].
Dr. Graul gives no explanation for the legislature's use of the May 3,1999 date, though the
simplest explanation is they intended the 2004 Amendments to apply retroactively. To
paraphrase Occam's Razor, "All things being equal, the simplest solution tends to be the
right one."
Statutory construction confirms the legislature's retroactive intent. "Unambiguous
language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Salt Lake
Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick 890 P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1995). Thus,
the Court assumes each term in the statute was used advisedly and does not ignore its plain
meaning. Id. "[The Court] must be guided by the law as it i s . . . When language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
construction." Id. (citations omitted). The enacting language of the 2004 Amendments is
clear and unambiguous. By writing the statute to expressly apply to agreements after May
3, 1999, the legislature clearly expressed retroactive intent and the trial court properly
rejected Dr. Graul's Arbitration Agreement.

7

Dr. Graul errs in demanding the legislature actually use the word "retroactive" instead
of providing an earlier effective date as done here. Dr. Graul offers no authority so holding.
Rather, "[t]he presumption in favor of the prospective applicability of a statute may be
rebutted when the legislature clearly and unequivocally expresses its intent that the
legislation will apply retrospectively. The words 'heretofore' and 'has been/ or other
expressions denoting past time, expressly give the statute a retrospective operation." C.J.S.
STATUTES § 408 (1999)(emphasis added). For example, inNervo v. Mealey, 25 N.Y.S.2d
632, 634 (N.Y. Sup. 1940), the statute read, "[i]n case a suspension or revocation has been
made and the commissioner is satisfied that there was such a failure..." (Emphasis added).
The Court did not require the statute to contain the term "retroactive," but rather found clear
legislative intent from the words "has been" denoting past time. Our legislature's use of the
date May 3, 1999 serves the same purpose and has the same effect.
Here, the legislature clearly expressed its intent the 2004 Amendments were to
operate retrospectively by expressly applying them to arbitration agreements signed after
May 2, 1999. The legislature repeated its intent in Subsection (5) of the Arbitration Act
stating, "The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999." See Utah Code
Ann. §78-14-17(5)(2004). "The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain meaning
of the statute." Cache Co. v. Property TaxDiv. of Utah State Tax Com% 922 P.2d 758,767
(Utah 1996). Had the legislature intended to apply the amendments only prospectively, as
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Dr. Graul avers, they would have simply drafted the enacting line of the statute to read,
"After May 3, 2004 . . ." The fact the legislature did not do so is a sufficiently express
declaration of retroactive intent. The trial court, thus, properly found Dr. Graul's Agreement
invalid because it did not comply with the 2004 Amendments.
II.

DR. GRAUL'S MERE MENTION OF A POSSIBLE CONTRACT
CLAUSE VIOLATION DID NOT PRESERVE SUCH A CLAIM FOR
APPEAL

Dr. Graul failed to preserve her contract clause argument for appeal. Dr. Graul did
not include this argument in her initial brief in support of her Motion to Compel Arbitration.
[R. 12-17]. Obviously, then, Mrs. Soriano did not address it in her opposition brief. [R. 2132]. The argument, such as it is, was thrown in as an afterthought to Dr. Graul's reply
memorandum. The argument, in its entirety, consisted of the following: "Retroactive
application of the 2004 amendment would obviate the one-year term specified by statute and
in the Arbitration Agreement, would impair the contractual relationship between parties, and
would fail to pass muster under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions,
which prohibits laws 'impairing the obligations of contracts.' U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 18." [R. 48-49]. Yet, having lost her other arguments, Dr. Graul now
devotes a quarter of her brief to the argument. This is improper.
Mere citations cannot be thrown into briefs to act as appellate place holders in case
other arguments actually addressed to the trial court fail; especially in the case of
constitutional interpretation. In State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,1 16; 164 P.3d 397, the

9

Utah Supreme Court stated, "[i]n order to further develop state constitutional law... claims
must be properly presented to this court." That means, "[t]he issue must be 'raised to a level
of consciousness' that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address it. It follows,
then, that perfunctorily mentioning an issue, without more, does not preserve it for appeal."
Id., accord Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^ 14; 122 P.3d 506 ("we are resolute in our
refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not been properly preserved, framed and
briefed...").
Here, Dr. Graul cited a constitutional provision, but gave no interpretation of the
provision or how the provision applied to the facts of this case. [R. 49]. As stated in State
v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 33; 122 P.3d 543, "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial
court may not be raised on appeal. A party cannot circumvent that rule by merely mentioning
an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority; such a 'mere
mention' does not preserve that issue for appeal." (Internal citations omitted).
In this case, Dr. Graul tossed in a constitutional violation argument at the end of a runon sentence in her reply brief. More is required to preserve issues for appeal for, otherwise,
trial court briefs will include bullet point arguments which serve as back-ups in the case of
an unfavorable ruling. Allowing the mere mention of an issue to serve as preservation mocks
the purpose of the rule that is to allow the parties to first argue the issue below and the trial
court the first opportunity to rule on the issue.
Here, Mrs. Soriano never had an opportunity to address the argument. The issue was
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not raised at the hearing before Judge Toomey. Judge Toomey did not rule on the issue in
her Memorandum Decision. [R.71-76]. In Brody v. Mills, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996),
defendant argued before this Court plaintiffs should be estopped from refusing to sell her a
condominium.

Defendant had indeed mentioned estoppel in her answer and further

mentioned it in a hearing before the trial court. Despite these brief mentions, this Court ruled
"these nominal references did not sufficiently raise the issue to a ievel of consciousness'
before the trial court." Id. at 364; quoting James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah App.
1987). Likewise, Dr. Graul failed to bring this issue to the trial court's attention, failed to
present legal authority or factual support for her argument, and failed to have it addressed
and decided. Therefore, she cannot raise the issue of a contracts clause violation for the first
time on appeal.
III.

DR. GRAUL'S ARBITRATION AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE
RENEWED IN VIOLATION OF THE 2004 AMENDMENTS

Dr. GrauPs last argument claims the trial court ignored the second portion of the
enacting language ofthe 2004 Amendments. The 2004 version of the Arbitration Act begins:
"After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care
provider to be validly executed, or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been
previously met on at least one occasion, renewed..." Dr. Graul interprets this provision as
follows: "In other words, all arbitration agreements entered into after May 2, 1999, must
meet the [2004 amendments] of Subsection (1), unless the physician-patient arbitration
agreement previously met the requirements of Subsection (1) under a previous version of the
11

statute." Appellate Brief at 19 (emphasis added).
Dr. Graul' s argument that the Arbitration Act's phrase "this Subsection (1)" somehow
refers to any "previous version" of the Act is unpersuasive. Statutes "should be interpreted
and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by
persons of ordinary intelligence and experience." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850
n. 14 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). It is a stretch indeed to interpret "this" to mem previous
versions of Subsection (1) that appear nowhere in the Act. Merriam-Webster defines "this"
as "what is stated in the following phrase, clause, or discourse." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary (2007).2 In this instance, the 2004 Amendments logically follow the word "this."
For a valid renewal to occur, the Agreement must thus comply with "this" Subsection (1) i.e. the 2004 Amendments.
Accordingly, even were we to accept Dr. Graul's argument the 2004 Amendments
were not retroactive, her Agreement is still unenforceable because it could not be renewed
without complying with the 2004 Amendments. Article 6 of Dr. Graul's Arbitration
Agreement defined the Term of the Agreement as one year from signing. After that "[i]t
shall be automatically renewed from year to year thereafter..." See Appendix A. Here, Dr.
Graul moved the trial court for enforcement of her Agreement more than two (2) years after
it was signed - meaning it had to be renewed twice under Article 6 (once in 2005 and again
in 2006). Yet, according to the 2004 Amendments, after May 2, 1999, for a binding

2

Attached as Appendix C.
12

arbitration agreement between a patient and health care provider to be renewed it had to meet
the requirements of this Subsection (1). It is undisputed Dr. GrauPs Agreement did not meet
the requirements of the 2004 Amendments and, therefore, could not be validly renewed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, appellee Gloria Soriano asks this Court affirm the trial
court's ruling, rejecting Dr. Graul's motion to enforce her in valid Arbitration Agreement.

Respectfully submitted this 2<S*day of October, 2007

SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C.

FreaK. Silvester
Spencer Siebers
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee Gloria Soriano
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prepaid, via first class United States mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEE'S
BRIEF to the following:
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
STEPHEN T. HESTER
WILLIAMS HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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'V*.
' : ^ g r e e m e n > to Arbitrates We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration alt aispure* u»u ui«„.«,
w
J for injuries and losses arising from the medical core rendered or which should have been rendered after the date of this Agreement^ claims
monetary damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the employees,
*nte and estates of any of them {hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for
•sonal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages. We agree that the Physician may pursue a legal oction
collect any fee from the patient and doing so shall not waive the Physician's right to compel arbitration of any malpractice claim. However,
owing the assertion of any malpractice claim against the Physician, any fee dispute, whether or not the subject of any existing legal action, shall
o be resolved by arbitration.
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or
lich should have been rendered by Physician after the dote of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children,
*ether born or unborn at the time of the occurrence giving rise tp any claim [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Patient"),
Article 2 : W a i v e r o f Right t o Trial: We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies
a court of low, including the right to o jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration aword and to
cflftate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act.
Article 3: Procedures ond Appointment of Arbitrators: Patient shall serve Physician by certified mail with a written demand
r arbitration which shall specify the nature of the claim, the date of the claimed occurrence, the complained of conduct by the Physician, and a
ascription of the Patient's injuries and damages. Within 60 days after the demand, the parties shall agree upon a neutral arbitrator to be selected
om a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the State or Federal courts of Utah. If the parties cannot agree upon a neutral arbitrator, the
Durt shall select an individual from that list. The neutral arbitrator shall: preside over the arbitration hearing and pre-arbitration conferences;
stablish scheduling orders; supervise the conduct of discovery to prevent abuse and insure efficiency and cost-effectiveness; rule on all motions,
icluding motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence; administer oaths; issue subpoenas;
ind exercise other powers granted to arbitrators in the Utah Arbitration Act. Within six months of the demand for arbitration or as otherwise ordered
>y the neutral arbitrator, Patient shall select one arbitrator and Physician shall select one arbitrator. Patient and Physician shall pay the fees and
expenses of his or her own arbitrator. Each party shall share equally the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator. The parties agree that the
arbitrators have the immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of an arbitrator under this Agreement.
All claims based on the same occurrence, incident, or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding; however, Patient or Physician shall have
he absolute right to arbitrate separately issues of liability and damage upon written request to the neutral arbitrator. Arbitration hearings will be
held in the County of the Physician's principal place of business or elsewhere as the parties may agree.
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional party in a court
action and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action against such additional person or entity shall be stayed
upon agreement to participate in the arbitration.
The parties agree that the arbitration proceedings are private, not public, and the privacy of the parties and of the arbitration proceedings
shall be preserved.
Article 4 : A p p l i c a b l e L o w : With respect to any matter not herein expressly provided for, the arbitration shall be governed by the
Utah Arbitration Act. All provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, with the exception of the notice of intent and pre-litigotion hearing
requirements which the parties hereby waive, sholl opply to the arbitration. The comparative fault provisions of Utah law opply to the arbitration
and the arbitrators shall apportion fault to all persons or entities who contributed to the claimed injury whether or not they are parties to the
arbitration,
Article 5 : Revocotiofi! This Agreement may be revoked by written notice mailed to the Physician, by certified mail, within 30 days after
signature, and if not revoked shall govern all medical services received by the Patient after the date of this Agreement.
Article 6 : T e r m : The term of this Agreement is one year from the date it is signed. It shall be automatically renewed from year to year
thereafter unless either party to this Agreement notifies the other of his or her election not to renew in writing delivered by certified mail prior to the
renewal date.
Article 7 : R e o d o n d Understood? I (Patient or Patient's representative) have read and I understand the above Agreement which
has been verbally explained to me to my satisfaction. I understand that I have the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and I dc
not have any unanswered questions. I execute this agreement of my own free will and not under any duress.
Article 8 : R e c e i v e d C o p y : 1 hove received a copy of this document.
Article 9 : S e v e r a b i l i t y : If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain
full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision.

Name of Physician, Gr&ujyor Clinic

Name of Pofienf (Print)

By:
Signature of Physi6ar^ or
Authorized Representative

(Date)

Signoture/^fPatient orPatient's
Representative

(Date)

(3/03)

0i
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8088392106
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Mandatory Medical Arbitration:
The Wrong Answer to the Rising Cost of
Health Care in Utah
Bryson B. Morgan
Few pieces of legislation draw attention from the public, and in the increasingly hurried Utah legislative
process legislators themselves have littletimeto analyze each bill. In 2003, the Utah State Legislature passed
Senate Bill 138, which allowed physicians to deny care to patients that refused to sign a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement. In passing the legislation, legislators relied heavily on claims that increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums were due to skyrocketing medical malpractice lawsuits, and inordinate
awards from "runaway" juries. In doing so, the true scope and cause of the increasing insurance premiums
were overlooked. Just months later Intermountain Health Care adopted mandatory arbitration for more than
170,000 of its patients. The public response to IHC s policy was swift and severe, resulting in the repeal of
mandatory arbitration only one year later during the 2004 Legislative Session. While the Legislature shoxM
be commended for their quick repeal of mandatory arbitration, given the rushed environment of the Utah
legislative process the public can expect such legislative errors to occur in the future

INTRODUCTION

E

ach January, the Utah State Legislature convenes for 45
consecutive days to address the problems facing the residents of Utah. Legislators are overloaded with information as they sort through the hundreds of proposed pieces
of legislation. What the exact impact that such legislation
will have on citizens is given a superficial treatment at best, as
the legislature continues its stampede to the end of the session. Within this atmosphere of law makers struggling to
understand the complex issues, die potential for error in lawmaking is increased. Legislators are forced to rely more and
more heavily on information from lobbyists and colleagues,
and when the time to vote on a bill arrives, it has become
common for a legislator to look to eitiher a member of leadership or the gallery for an indication of how to vote.
Most legislation enacted by the legislature is thought to
have little impact on the lives of citizens. The large majority
of the public does not pay close attention to the laws that are
passed, and displays little public reaction to them. Mandatory
medical arbitration, permitted by S.B. 138: Medical
Malpractice Amendments, however, proved to be the exact
opposite as public reaction was immediately strong and overwhelmingly negative. Only after the public recognized and
reacted to the impact of S.B. 138 did the legislature attempt
to revise the legislation. The purpose of this essay is to explore

the law making process through the passage and later repeal
of S.B. 138. This essay will focus on the inadequate attention
given to the issue during the 2003 legislative session, and how
health care providers such as IHC implemented an unpopular
and controversial mandatory arbitration policy.
AGENDA SETTING: MANDATORY MEDICAL
ARBITRATION
The turmoil started with, and was based almost solely on,
what Mark Fotheringham, spokesman for the Utah Medical
Association (UMA), called "some indication that with widespread adoption of arbitration there will be a positive effect on
premiums" (Collins 2003, AOl). The rising costs of health
care not only in Utah, but nationwide, have been a concern
to many lawmakers. One of the most commonly cited reasons
for the rising cost of health care are medical malpractice lawsuits, and "runaway" juries awarding excessive amounts for
damages which allegedly led to exorbitant medical malpractice insurance premiums for doctors. Such was the case with
Grant Carter, MD. "After making the hardest decision of his
life, Grant Carter had to break the bad news to his patients:
He was no longer delivering babies." In giving his reason for
leaving the practice he commented, "It became economically
unfeasible" (Hamilton 2004c, AOl).
Virtually all of us have heard about the sudden spikes in
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medical malpractice insurance premiums for Utah physicians
Catherine D Burton, MD in a letter to several legislators
claimed, "We, as physicians will eventually be forced out of
medicine (as some of our colleagues already have) because of
uncontrollable medical malpractice" (C Burton, 2004)
Alarming statistics are often cited For example, the
University of Utah has seen the number of Ob-Gyn resident
applications decrease from 175 applicants five years ago to
only 126 this year (Hamilton 2004b, A01) This example is
valid, as medical malpractice insurance premiums have
increased rapidly over the last few years In fact, "Utah ObGyns saw their insurance premiums jump 94 percent over the
past four years, from $42,000 to $81,628 per year" (Hamilton
2004b, A01) Other physicians in the state and country have
experienced similar increases This rapid jump threatens the
future of our health care system Some argue that in the near
future it will be difficult to find Ob-Gyns and other high specialty doctors Doctors and the insurance industry contend
that there are a skyrocketing number of medical malpractice
lawsuits, and that these lawsuits are pnmanly to blame for the
sharp premium increase The threat of malpractice lawsuits is
one that most physicians feel very strongly about Addressing
this threat, Dr T Scott Lindley said, "The closest parallel I
can think of is having cancer or a chronic, incurable disease"
(Collins 2004, A01)
THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS: INTENSE
PRESSURE AND FLAWED ANALYSIS
In the 2003 General Legislative Session, Senator Leonard
Blackham (R-Morom) introduced Senate Bill 138 The bill
would amend Utah Code Ann 78-14-17, that was enacted in
1999, in the following ways
1 Allowed a physician to refuse care if the patient declined
to sign an arbitration agreement
2 Provided for automatic reneu al of the agreement each
year unless the agreement is canceled m writing before
the renewal date
3 Allowed the patient to rescmd the agreement within 30
days of signing the agreement
4 Required that one arbiter be chosen by all persons claiming
damages one arbiter be selected by the health care
provider and a third arbiter be selected jointly from a list of
individuals approved by the state or federal courts of Utah

A strong lobbying effort was mounted by well-funded groups
such as Intermountam Health Care (IHC), UMA, and the
Utah Medical Insurance Association (UMIA) The lobbying
effort had begun well before the opening of the legislative session On December 20, 2002, one month before the 2003 legislative session began, the Utah Trial Lawyers Association's
(UTLA) leaders were in attendance at a meeting in the
UMA's offices Douglas G Mortensen, President of the
UTLA Board of Governors, related what happened

Bryson B Moigan

Association revealed their commitment to amend Utah's
arbitration statute in a wa^ which would allow physicians to
refuse care to patients declining to sign arbitration agree
ments
We were invited to support, or at least not oppose
the legislation We were uarned that if we opposed the legis
lation, other medical malpractice "reform" measures even less
favorable to our clients and to us would be introduced (2004
4)

The UTLA found itself in a difficult position, and on
February 14th 2003, a deal was struck The UTLA and the
Utah Healdi Care Community issued a joint statement that
acknowledged the withdrawal of other bills in return for the
UTLA's "withdrawing its opposition to S B 138 " The deal
included the addition of a six-year "sunset" provision to the
legislation In commenting on this deal, Mortensen wrote "In
agreeing to withdraw its opposition to S B 138, UTLA did
not agree that allowing health care providers to refuse treatment to patients declining to sign pre-dispute arbitration
agreements was in the public interest or would likely lead to a
decrease in malpractice premiums, nor did it agree that a medical malpractice lawsuit "cnsis" existed" (2004)
After the withdrawal of UTLA's opposition, S B 138
passed in the Utah State Senate on February 21, 2003, by a
vote of 24-3-2, and later in the U t a h House of
Representatives on March 5, 2003, by a vote of 63-11-1 S B
138 passed despite the unanimous opinion of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), Amencan Bar Association
(ABA), and the American Medical Association (AMA) published in their July 1998 fmal report on health care dispute
resolution which stated that "The agreement to use arbitration should be knowing and voluntary
In disputes involving patients, binding forms dispute resolution should be used
only where the parties agree to do so after the dispute anses " (American Arbitration Association [AAA], American
Bar Association [ABA], Amencan Medical Association
[AMA], 1998) In passing this bill the legislature gave inadequate consideration to the scope of the problem, the causes of
the problem, the proposed solution, and the impact of the bill
on the public
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A 1999 report regarding "medical errors" by the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) demonstrates that far too many Americans
face serious possibility of injury, or even death, due to medical
mistakes in hospitals Using the IOM's low estimate of 44,000
deaths per year, medical errors are the eighth leading cause of
death in the United States, ahead of both breast cancer and
AIDS The IOM's high-range estimate of 98,000 deaths a year
would make medical error related deaths the fifth leading
cause of death, more than all other accidental deaths combined (Institute of Medicine, 1999)

Representatives of the Utah Medical Association Utah
Medical Insurance Association and the Utah Hospital
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THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
Are medical malpractice lawsuits and "runaway juries" awarding excessive amounts for damages to blame for the high costs
of health care? Each side has numbers and statistics to support
their claim. The many conflicting charts and graphs can easily
lead to confusion. As one article reported, "The arguments pro
and con are full of data - and honest differences of opinion
about how to interpret them. Sorting out the truth is as frustrating as trying to scoop water with a pillowcase" (Collins
2004, A01). Utah is not the only state struggling to sort out the
mounds of data. An article in Florida's Sun Sentinel stated:
During the 13 hours of grilling, senators watched a gaggle of
state officials, lobbyists, doctors, and insurance executives eat
their previously quoted words - or wish they could. "We have
been working on the issue for one year, but we got more information in two days when we were able to extract the truth
under oath," observes Sen. Durrell Peaden jr., a Republican.
In other words, when witnesses who lie could face charges of
perjury, the Judiciary Committee stopped getting "weasel
words" and "doublespeak," says Sen. Tom Lee, another
Republican. In sworn testimony, senators learned that doctors
are not fleeing the state, applications to practice medicine
here have increased, emergency rooms and trauma centers are
not closing doors because of rising medical malpractice premiums, frivolous malpractice lawsuits are not a problem, and
malpractice lawsuits [awards] have not skyrocketed
(Goldstein 2003, A01).
Is this the case in Utah? Is there really no crisis at all? Several
statistics cannot be ignored. As a percent of their total
income, doctors pay about the percentage of income for medical malpractice insurance as they have historically paid. For
surgeons, that figure is about 6 percent, for Ob-Gyns about 8.5
percent, and for all physicians in general it is about 5 percent
(Newhall, 2004a). Over the last ten years malpractice payouts
have grown an average of 6.2 percent between 1990 and
2001. That is almost exactly the rate of medical inflation; an
average of 6.7 percent between 1990 and 2001 (Woellert
2003). And, if caps on damages are the answer as many claim,
then why do 11 of the 25 identified medical malpractice crisis states already have caps in place? (Newhall 2004a).
Currently nineteen states including Utah have implemented
caps on non-compensatory economic damages. For example,
the most that a person can be awarded in non-economic damages in Utah is $400,000. The Weiss Report shows that while
caps on awards did reduce the burden on insurers, most insurers continued to increase premiums at a rapid pace. This has
been the case in Utah. Further, the report states that "there
are other, far more important factors driving the rise in medical malpractice premiums than caps or medical malpractice
payouts" (Weiss 2003).
According to Doug Mortensen, President of UTLAs
Board of Governors, there is also much evidence that, "socalled measures of 'tort reform' having the effect of restricting
the rights of injured patients, have never brought about their
proponents' promised decrease in malpractice premiums"
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(2004). In testimony given before the Subcommittee on
Health of the U.S. House Committee on Energy and
Commerce regarding medical malpractice insurance rates,
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director of the Consumer
Federation of America (CFA), stated that "Medical
Malpractice rates are not rising in a vacuum. Commercial
insurance rates are rising overall" (2002). Regarding the
claims that medical malpractice premiums are the cause of the
increase in the cost of health care, Clark Newhall, MD, JD,
points out:
Medical malpractice insurance premiums have nothing to do
with increases in health care costs. It is true that the most current figures show that out of the 1.55 trillion dollars in health
care costs only $8.8 billion are medical malpractice insurance
premiums. That works out to 57 cents in malpractice premium for every 100 dollars in health care costs (2004b).
The maximum potential savings that could be attained if all
forms of legal redress for injured patients were eliminated
would be under 60 cents on a $100 medical bill. This figure is
not a significant enough percentage to justify the constant
allegation that medical malpractice insurance costs are to
blame for the high cost of health care. Furthermore, medical
malpractice premiums as a percent of health care costs have
been steadily declining over the past decade from .95 percent
in 1988 to an estimated .57 percent in 2003 (A.M. Best's and
Company, 2001). So what is the cause of the drastic increase
in medical malpractice premiums? The facts point to the natural "insurance cycle" of "hard" and "soft" markets.
In his testimony, Travis Plunkett of the CFA gave many
answers to the cause of increasing premiums. "Insurers are
pointing fingers," Plunkett said, "when they should be looking in the mirror." Further he stated that it is the "hard insurance market and the insurance industry's own business practices that are largely to blame for the rate shock that physicians have experienced in recent months" (Plunkett 2002).
Ironically, his opinion was even recognized by IHC. In an
internal memo, IHC stated that "A number of observers
believe that the cycle of insurance company investments, and
their subsequent hard and soft markets, correlate better with
the pattern of changes in malpractice premium rates than do
jury awards - either numbers of awards or dollars" (McConkie
2004).
Insurance is a cyclical business. According to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners:
underwriting cycles may be caused by some or all of the following factors: 1. Adverse loss shocks...unusually large loss of
shock may lead to supra-competitive prices. 2. Changes in
interest rates... 3. Under pricing in soft markets (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners [NAIC] 1991).
Prior to September 11, 2001, the insurance industry had been
in a soft market since the late 1980s. The usual six to ten year
economic cycle had been expanded by the amazing stock
market of the 1990s. No matter how much insurance compa-
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nies cut their rates, they wound up having a great year when
investing the "float" on the premium in this amazing market
(the float occurs during the time between when premiums are
paid to the insurer and losses paid out by the insurer—for
example there is about a 15 month lag in auto insurance).
Further, interest rates were relatively high in recent years as
the Federal Reserve focused on inflation. But, from the year
2000 to 2002, the market turned with a vengeance and the
Fed cut interest rates again and again. Item two above had
occurred well before September 11. Item three above, the low
rates, were also apparent. Insurance companies* operating
profit as a percentage of premium dropped from 13 percent of
premium in 1997 to about 3.5 percent of premium in 2000
(A.M. Best Company 2001). Well before September 11 the
cycle had turned, rates were rising, and a hard market was
developing. As Plunkett states, "An anticipated price jump of
10 to 15 percent in 2001 was predicted by the CFA and confirmed by the Insurance Information Institute" (2002).
Item number one, the shock loss, was all that was missing. The attacks of September 11 provided that in an achingly painful way. While the increases were mostly due to the
cycle turn, they were sped up by the attack, collapsing two
years of anticipated increases into a few months. The practices of the insurance industry itself are largely to blame.
Plunkett noted that "Each time the cycle turns from a soft
market to a hard market the response by insurers is predictable: they shift from inadequate under-pricing to unconscionable over-pricing, cut back on coverage, and blame large
jury verdicts for the problem" (2002).
This turn in cycle had a particularly strong effect on
Utah's largest medical malpractice insurer. The physician run
UMIA is a relatively small company and so it finds it harder
to keep rates low in an era when the larger insurers are competing for the business of Utah physicians. When the market
turned down, many of the larger insurers got out of the medical malpractice insurance business. However, smaller insurers
like the UMIA, who have no other choice, remained in the
medical malpractice insurance business and watched as their
profits plummeted. Physicians became outraged when they
suddenly had to raise rates to make up for the previous years
of less expensive coverage.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: I H G ' S ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
Soon after die adoption of S.B. 138, IHC implemented
mandatory arbitration for many of its customers. In a radio
interview Senator Parley Hellewell (R-Orem) admitted,
"When we passed the bill last year, we had no idea what kinds
of things that IHC would put in their contract that would
make it so one-sided and so lopsided" (2004). An analysis of
common provisions of IHC's and other arbitration agreement
follows:
1. High cost of Arbitration: Article 3 (C) of IHC's arbitration agreement stated that: "Patient(s) and
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Provider(s) will each pay the fees and expenses of the
arbitrator they appointed. Each side shall also pay onehalf of the fees and expenses of the Presiding
Arbitrator and the other expenses of the arbitration
panel." (McConkie 2004). Patients pay thousands of
dollars per day to arbitrate. Most cases occupy more
than one day and a complicated case could occupy
many more. For example, a ten day case would cost
$40,000, of which the patient is required to pay half,
win or lose. Compared to a court filing fee of about
$200, and arbitration is clearly the more expensive
option. In court, the the process is at no cost to either
the defendant or the plaintiff.
2. Forfeiture of past or future claims. Upon signing the
agreement, patients must give up their right to sue
IHC for any past or future claims, and pursue those
claims through arbitration. For example, patients with
medical injuries that occurred prior to the signing of
the agreement, and for which an action may be currently pending, can be forced to start those claims
from the beginning, this time through arbitration.
3. Patients forfeit their right to sue any person or company who contracts with IHC: The arbitration agreement covers "any person or entity in any way
employed by, contracting with, or working for IHC"
(McConkie 2004). Parties not even employed by IHC
and others who are not actual signatories to the document are thereby released from any civil legal action
for malpractice. For example, if IHC contracts with a
company that supplies a faulty pacemaker, the patient
cannot sue that company.
4. IHC retains the right to sue patients: Patients give
up their right to go to trial against IHC. However,
IHC reserves the right to go to trial and pursue legal
action by any means against a patient.
5. Patients have no right of appeal: "Arbitration is your
sole and exclusive remedy. That means that you waive
your right to...seek any other legal remedy"
(McConkie 2004). Arbitration is final and binding,
meaning that the patient is bound by die decision of
the arbitration panel. Patients waive their right to
seek any other legal remedy. The ability to appeal
influences bodi parties to reach a fair and just decision. Without the right to appeal, this important
check on the legal system is lost.
6. Patients sign away more than just their rights:
Patients sign away the rights of their spouse, heirs,
children, and unborn children: IHC maintains that
parents can forfeit the legal right to sue of dieir minor
and unborn children and that one spouse can forfeit
the rights of another, even when they are separated,
without mutual consent and knowledge.
7. Secrecy of arbitration proceedings: The outcome of
arbitration proceeding is private and confidential.
While IHC maintained that it was an important pro-
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tection of a patient's right to privacy, this provision of
the arbitration agreement prevents the public from
eveT learning the identities of IHC physicians who
potentially practice bad medicine in that diey have
been repeatedly accused or convicted of malpractice.
However, IHC will be able to closely track the outcome of arbitration proceedings. The information
gathered could be used by IHC to improve its defense
strategies while patients will be denied access to information to prepare for their own cases. For example, if
an arbiter on the approved list leans in IHC's direction
repeatedly when deciding a case, the patient will not
have access to this information while IHC will.
8. Arbitration agreement automatically renews itself:
The IHC contract automatically renews each year
unless the patient cancels the agreement before the
renewal date. Once IHC receives a signature for treatment, the agreement does not end. IHC makes renewal automatic each year. The only way to get out of the
agreement is for the patient to contact IHC and follow
their procedures to cancel the agreement. Upon termination of the agreement the patient is asked to go
elsewhere for medical help.
9. Patients are coerced into signing IHC arbitration
agreements: In most cases, patients are part of
employee/employer health plans. This means that
they are less able to change their health plan unless
their employer switches all employees over to a new
health plan. In rural areas and in other high specialty
areas many times there are no other alternatives. It is
more than likely that a patient who refuses to sign the
agreement must chose no treatment at all. Without
other options available to the patient, his or her ability to choose is severely limited.
POLICY IMPACT
While the passage of S.B. 138 drew little public attention,
IHC's implementation of their mandatory arbitration agreement did. Whether the public understood the fine points of
the legislation is doubtful. However, the one-sided nature of
the bill soon became evident. In late November of 2003, IHC
mailed out over 170,000 letters to Utah citizens in Bountiful
and Salt Lake City announcing that patients would be
required to sign the arbitration agreement before receiving
medical care. They were told that if they refused to sign the
agreement they would have to go elsewhere for medical care.
Certainly, the way in which IHC presented arbitration, and
the details of their agreement, were diought unethical by
many, even by those within the health care community. Scott
Barton, an Ob-Gyn at Old Farm Obstetrics and Gynecology7
in Salt Lake City, said, "It's unfortunate that IHC made this
come to a head. I don't know if IHC took enough time to
explain it [arbitration] to their patients" (Hamilton 2004a,
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B01). Even R. Chet Loftis, UMA General Counsel, in an email to legislators wrote, "We believe that it is unfortunate
that IHC chose to introduce arbitration to its patients in the
way that it did" (2004).
Thousands of consumers were surprised and even outraged when they learned the details of the agreement. As a
KSL editorial noted, "Last year, you'll recall, lawmakers passed
a bill to allow mandatory medical arbitration. To say the public didn't buy it is an understatement. The outcry was loud
and determined" ("Medical Arbitration" 2004). In a poll conducted January 18, 2004, by the Salt Lake Tribune, the subjects
were asked: "Should health care providers be allowed to
require arbitration of disputes over possible medical malpractice and prohibit lawsuits as a condition of treatment?" 56.3
percent responded "No," 34-8 percent responded "Yes," and
8.9 percent responded "Don't know" ("Should Health Care"
2004). In addition, a Dan Jones and Associates poll conducted Dec 27-Jan 3 2003-2004, asked: "In general, do you favor
or oppose patients signing binding arbitration agreements
before being treated by a doctor or hospital?" Similar results
were found, as 22 percent responded that diey were strongly
in favor, 17 percent responded that they were somewhat in
favor, and 38 percent indicated strong opposition to arbitration agreements (Collins 2004, A01).
POLICY EVALUATION: A LEGISLATIVE CORRECTION
In the weeks leading up to the 2004 legislative session the
debate heated up. Sides were formed, including groups such as
Patients Against Mandatory Medical Arbitration (PAMMA)
and the Utah's Citizen's Alliance (UCA), both fighting to
repeal S.B. 138, while arbitration supporters included IHC,
the Arbitration Alliance, and hundreds of Utah physicians.
Each organization had well funded agendas and convincing
lobbyists to sway the views of not only the lawmakers, but the
public as a whole. As the Deseret Morning News reported on
December 24, 2003:
Members of a group called PAMMA, Patients Against
Mandatory Medical Arbitration, picketed outside the Salt
Lake Clinic...handing out information packets and waving
signs with messages like 'IHC refuses to treat sick babies! Sign
or Suffer' (Collins 2003a, B01).

On the first day of the 2004 Utah General Legislative Session
lawmakers were greeted in the capitol with a rally of more
than 30 protesters urging the repeal of S.B. 138. They were
joined by legislators such as Representative Mike Thompson
(R-Orem), and Senator Parley Hellewell.
Two pieces of legislation were proposed to repeal S.B.
138: S.B. 117 sponsored by Senator Parley Hellewell, and S.B.
245 sponsored by Senator Leonard Blackham. At the beginning of the session, the differences in the pieces of legislation
were few. They both repealed the right of a physician to refuse
care to a patient who declined to sign an arbitration agreement, however S.B. 117 called for a sole arbiter in the case
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that a patient voluntarily opted for arbitration; while S.B. 245
called for a panel of three. At first IHC opposed both pieces
of legislation, but as a local newspaper reported:
IHC had only tested the policy for three months before bowing to pressure from legislators, patients' advocacy groups, and
trial lawyers. Now, the 400 IHC-employed physicians in Salt
Lake County and Bountiful will no longer demand patients to
sign agreements or be refused care.... IHC reversed its hard'
line support of forced arbitration and agreed to back a bill proposed by Sen. Leonard Blackham, R-Moroni (Hamilton
2004c, A01).

Even Elliott J. Williams, a prominent former advocate for S.B.
138, when speaking in a Utah House Minority Caucus meeting stated, "We all agree that compulsory arbitration was not
a good idea.... [Arbitration as an option if chosen voluntarily is a good one" (2004). The complete reversal of opinion
was almost immediate as IHC struggled to maintain its reputation.
The issue soon turned into not whether or not a physician could require arbitration agreements, but whether a one
or three member panel should be used when a patient had
voluntarily chosen arbitration. Strong opinions were voiced
from each side. Senator Parley Hellewell said, "With three
arbitrators, it guarantees that IHC wins every single time"
(Spangler 2004), while Elliott Williams, the self-proclaimed
Utah arbitration expert, said that "Most Utah arbiters are
reluctant or refuse to take cases where they are the sole decision maker." The advocates of a single arbiter cited lower
costs to consumers, while the advocates of a three member
panel cited the "small universe of people qualified to be a sole
arbiter" as the basis for their argument (Williams 2004).
The issue continued to be debated until the final hours of
the legislative session. It was finally resolved in a quick hall
huddle in the final few hours of the legislative session. "That
was one of the quickest conference committees I've been
to.... Fast and furious" remarked Senator Blackham (Bryson
2004b). The result of the conference committee was a widely
accepted compromise, and the final bill:
1. Prohibited a health care provider from denying health
care to a patient in the sole basis that the patient
refused to sign an arbitration agreement.
2. Allowed the patient to rescind a signed arbitration
agreement within 10 days of signing it.
3. Established a three member arbitration panel unless
both sides agree to a single arbiter.
S.B. 245 passed die Utah State Senate on March 3, 2004 by
a unanimous vote of 26 to 0 with three absent, and later
passed the Utah House of Representatives on the same day by
a vote of 64 to 6 with 5 absent. "We hope this will be resolved
once and for all," said Senate President Al Mansell (R-Sandy)
(Bryson 2004a). Senator Blackham, the sponsor of S.B. 245,
commented, "I believe this is a well balanced approach that is
fair and reasonable" (Bryson 2004b). However, not all were
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pleased with the outcome. Cheryll Willey, office manager at
Wasatch Internal Medicine, said, "We were getting a five percent discount from UMIA, which is peanuts, but every little
bit helps because the malpractice rates are so expensive"
(Hamilton 2004, A01). While a five percent discount on
medical malpractice premiums may help some struggling doctors, the Legislature agreed that mandatory medical arbitration was too high a price to pay.
CONCLUSION
The repeal of S.B. 138 was a victory for the citizens of Utah.
It shows, to a certain extent, that the opinions of Utahns can
have a significant effect on decisions of the Utah State
Legislature. Mandatory arbitration was enacted due to a lack
of information and foresight. The overwhelming majority of
legislators accepted the claims by the UMA and UMIA that
health care costs were rising due to large medical malpractice
payouts. Few legislators understood the complexity and scope
of the problem. Once properly informed, the Legislature
acted to right die wrong it had created only one year prior. In
this case the Utah State Legislature should be commended for
its quick response and urged to give a more thorough and critical analysis of the hundreds of bills proposed each year.
Many of us unrealistically expect and assume that our
elected officials make decisions only after being properly
informed. The passage and later repeal of S.B. 138 shows that
there are serious faults in the way that our legislators receive
their information. In many instances important decisions are
made without the proper time for debate and analysis. As not
only die sheer quantity of legislation increases, but more complicated issues come before the Utah State Legislature, more
and more legislators turn to lobbyists, colleagues, and other
special interests for direction. In this setting of rushed analysis and speculation, it becomes easy for a legislator to accept
the facts and figures presented by interest groups as reality. In
an intense and compact legislative session, it is ever more
unrealistic to expect any issue to receive adequate attention,
and the possibility of "legislative errors" is enhanced.
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